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1. INTRODUCTION

As the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (BWT)' reaches its
centennial it has earned many of the plaudits bestowed on it. The BWT
accomplished a number of key Great Lakes specific matters in ways that
are unlikely ever to be revisited. Besides establishing the location of the
international border, the BWT addressed key matters of navigational
t Professor of Law, Florida A & M University, College of Law. A.B., 1969, with
honors, University of Michigan; J.D., 1973, with distinction, University of Michigan.
1. Boundary Waters Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit. (for Can.), Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448
[hereinafter BWT].
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rights, giving Canada access to waters wholly within the United States,
most prominently Lake Michigan, but also addressing transit from the
lakes to the ocean via the St. Lawrence River. 2 Beyond those one-time
and unique boundary settling and issues of navigation in the Great Lakes
region, the BWT created a governance structure that has minimized
water-related conflict in its century of operation. At the core of the
BWT's operation is one of the best respected international bodies, the
International Joint Commission (IJC). 3 The IJC has thrived, despite its
potential for impasse at the hands of its evenly divided voting authority,
by building a record of impeccable research and analysis and promoting
bi-national consensus. Over time, the BWT and the IJC have addressed
the whole range of water use issues, ranging from navigation, to
diversions, to water quality. At times, such as with the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, 4 the approach to a problem has extended into
additional non-treaty agreements of the two nations, but even then, the
underlying BWT structure of equal representation and the exemplary
commitment to a science-based approach of the IJC provided the fulcrum
for enduring improvement of the waters. Quite certainly, the
interjurisdictional management of the shared water resource performed
by the BWT and IJC helped maintain harmonious relations between the
United States and Canada for the past century.
In an age of increasing interjurisdictional water conflict and water
management concern, the BWT's list of accomplishments, reached in a
harmonious manner, raises the possibility that, perhaps, the management
mechanisms of the BWT might beneficially be used in other contexts.
This Article will take up that possibility in the context of three
contemporary American interstate water allocation disputes. These
disputes are (1) a relatively simple cross-border complaint by a
downstream state, South Carolina, that North Carolina cities are using
too much water of the Catawba River; 5 (2) the basin-wide dispute
regarding water use and allocation in the Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint Basin; 6 and (3) the claim of the State of Mississippi that the water
utility company serving Memphis, Tennessee and its growing urban area,
is violating Mississippi's rights and those of her citizens to groundwater
of the regional Sparta Aquifer, also referred to at times as the Memphis

2. See generally id.
3. See id. art. III.
4. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301;
amended Nov. 22, 1978,30 U.S.T. 1383; amended Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11551.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.
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Sands Aquifer.7 This is, necessarily, an imprecise exercise because of the
differences in the resources subject to management, the sovereigns, the
eras, the institutional capabilities of the parties, and, most speculatively,
the political feasibility of getting initial agreement to put something like
the BWT in place. What emerges is the belief that only some aspects of
the BWT structure will work in other settings. Thus, the BWT cannot be
transplanted on a wholesale basis to the Catawba, ACF, or Sparta
Aquifer, but, importantly, what is transferrable includes several of the
key elements of BWT/IJC governance.
II. A SNAPSHOT OF THREE AMERICAN DOMESTIC WATER CONFLICTS
THAT USEFULLY MIGHT CONSIDER A WATER ALLOCATION AND
MANAGEMENT REGIME INCLUDING BWT/IJC ELEMENTS

A. CatawbaRiver: North Carolinaand South Carolina
This water use conflict took on high relief in 2007 when South
Carolina sought, and was granted leave, to file an original action in the
United States Supreme Court. 8 The complaint 9 alleges that North
Carolina, the upstream state on the Catawba River,' has authorized past
interbasin diversions from the Catawba, most recently in 2007. The
complaint further alleges that the existing and threatened additional
diversions are depriving South Carolina of an equitable share of the
Catawba's water." The authorized transfers total forty-eight million

7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See South Carolina v. North Carolina, 128 S. Ct. 349 (2007) (granting motion for
leave to file bill of complaint).
9. Motion of the State of South Carolina for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint,
and Brief in Support of Its Motion for Leave to File Complaint, South Carolina, 128 S.
Ct. 349 (2007) (No. 138, Original (06A1 150)), 2007 WL 3283683 [hereinafter South
CarolinaMotion]. The factual material in the text is drawn from this document, which
contains the Motion for Leave to File, the Complaint, and the Brief in Support of the
Motion to File that has a series of attached affidavits. In places, additional facts are taken
from the Brief of North Carolina in Opposition to the Motion for Leave to File, South
Carolina, 128 S. Ct. 349 (2007) (No. 138, Original (06A1 150)), 2007 WL 3283684
[hereinafter North Carolina Brief], and the subsequent Reply Brief of South Carolina,
South Carolina, 128 S. Ct. 349 (2007) (No. 138, Original (06A1 150)) 2007 WL 3324204
[hereinafter South Carolina Brief].
10. South Carolina Motion, supra note 9, at 1, 3. Roughly 225 miles after it crosses
into South Carolina, the Catawba is joined by the Big Wateree Creek and together they
form the Wateree River, so the basin is at times described as the Catawba-Wateree, but
the entire focus of the dispute is on the interbasin diversion of water out of the Catawba
by North Carolina before transit into South Carolina. Id.
11. Id. at 2.
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gallons per day (mgd) 12 which is equivalent to a flow rate of 74.4 cubic
feet per second (cfs). The hydrograph of the river fluctuates very widely
across the seasons, but in a dry year, such as 2001, that level of diversion
out of the basin constitutes ten percent or more of the river's flow for
more than half of that drought year.13
North Carolina contends that its actions are not inequitable, and that
the emphasis of South Carolina on flows reaching it in drought years
alone obscures a proper assessment of the equities.' 4 First, North
Carolina tends to focus only on the most recent ten mgd diversion,' 5 the
amount of the most recently allowed interbasin transfer of Catawba
water. Second, North Carolina emphasizes that in most years and large
portions of drought years South Carolina is receiving ample amounts of
water, noting that the most recent addition to the diversion "constitutes
less than 0.4% of the average flow of the Catawba River."' 6 Importantly
for equitable apportionment jurisprudence, North Carolina points to the
harms that it, too, suffers in drought years.' 7 North Carolina further
claims it is making strenuous conservation efforts during drought events,
and emphasizes the role that the diversion of Catawba water plays in
limiting harm in the importing basins of North Carolina. 18 Those aspects
of the situation also factor into equitable apportionment jurisprudence. 19
Finally, North Carolina believes that the extreme low flows of which
South Carolina complains will be avoided as a result of FERC
relicensing of the eleven Duke Energy dams on the Catawba. ° In that
proceeding there are careful studies and extensive modeling of basin
flows. 2' The expected result of the FERC process will be an operations
plan that ensures a minimum flow of 1100 cfs of the Catawba below
Lake Wylie, which is located at and forms a part of the interstate
boundary.2 2 That low flow limit would constitute a considerable increase
from the current operating parameters that allow flows out of Lake Wylie

12. Id.
13. See infraAppendix A (reproducing the 2001 hydrograph).
14. See North Carolina Brief, supra note 9, at 8-10, 18-20.
15. See, e.g., id. at 7.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Id. at 21 (reproducing Declaration of Thomas Fransen,
16a-20a & Declaration
of John Morris,
42a-44a).
19. See generally Colorado v. New Mexico 1,459 U.S. 176 (1982).
20. North Carolina Brief, supra note 9, at 12-15.
21. Catawba-Wateree CHEOPS Operations Model, North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, available at http://www.ncwater.org/Data-andModeling/Catawba (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
22. North Carolina Brief, supra note 9, at 3.
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to be as little as 411 cfs. 2 3 More concretely, North Carolina asserts the
new operating plan, if made part of the Duke Energy relicensing, would
more than counterbalance its upstream interbasin transfers.2
(ACF)Basin: Georgia, Alabama,
B. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
25
and Florida

This water dispute is in the process of taking a place of prominence
in the water annals of the eastern states alongside the Chicago Diversion
and the allocation of the use of Delaware River water among its basin
states. Numerous law review articles have addressed the subject,26 and

23. Id.
24. Id. at 4.
25. There is a welter of litigation and an even greater welter of commentary regarding
this dispute. The most recent court decision as of this writing is Southeastern Federal
Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A good summary of the
earlier stages of the multi-faceted litigation can be found at Alabama v. Army Corps of
Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117 (lth Cir. 2005). See also Georgia v. Army Corps of
Engineers, 302 F.3d 1242 (11 th Cir. 2002).
26. The following is a partiallist of ACF articles: Robert Abrams, Water Federalism
and the Army Corps of Engineers Role in Eastern States Water Allocation, 31 U. ARK.
LTTLE ROCK L. REv. 395 (2009) [hereinafter Water Federalism]; Jessica A. Bielecki,
Managing Resources with Interstate Compacts: A Perspectivefrom The Great Lakes, 14
BUFF. ENV'T. L.J. 173 (2007); Natasha Meruelo, Considering a Cooperative Water
Management Approach in Resolving the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintBasin Water
Wars, 18 FORDHAM ENV'T. L. REv. 335 (2007); Robert P. Fowler, Jeffrey H. Wood &
Thomas L. Casey, III, Maintaining The Navigability of America's Inland Waterways,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 16 (Fall 2006); Amall Golden Gregory, LLP, Eleventh Circuit
Allows Settlement on Lake LanierBetween Corps Atlanta Area Governments, GA. ENV'T.
L. LETTER (2005); Drew Melville, Whiskey is for Drinking: Recent Water Law
Developments in Florida, 20 J. LAND USE & ENV'T. L. 489 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, Water
Wars, Eastern Style: Divvying Up the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver Basin,
131 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 47 (2005); Josh Clemons, Interstate Water
Disputes:A Road Mapfor the States, 12 S.E. ENV'T. L.J. 115 (2004); Douglas L. Grant,
Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme Court: The
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 401 (2004); J.B.
Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Lawfor a New Water
Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENv'T. L. 47 (2003); C. Hansell Watt, IV, Comment, Who Gets
the Hooch?: Georgia, Florida,and Alabama Battle for Water from the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-FlintRiver Basin, 55 MERCER L. REv. 1453 (2003); Robert Abrams,
Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 155 (2002) [hereinafter Interstate Water Allocation]; Dustin S.
Stephenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling Waters and Fading Opportunities, 16 J.
LAND USE & ENV'T. L. 83 (2000); C. Grady Moore, Water Wars: Interstate Water
Allocation in the Southeast, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T. 5 (1999); Jeffrey Uhlman
Beaverstock, Comment, Learning to Get Along: Alabama, Georgia, Florida and the
Chattahoochee River Compact, 49 ALA. L. REv. 993 (1998); Carl Erhardt, The Battle
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three separate federal court lawsuits that have generated three significant
appellate opinions ruling on aspects of the controversy 27 and the
simultaneous litigation in different venues has led to the convocation of
multi-district litigation. Still, to a significant degree, the case remains
unresolved on its merits. The story of the ACF dispute is already a long
tale, one in which the public dispute among the states surfaced more than
twenty years ago. It has simple elements, and elements as complex as the
diversity of the basin's urban and rural economies and as divergent as are
the region's high savannah and Gulf Coast ecology.
The simplest to understand and most visible aspect of the dispute is
the need of metropolitan Atlanta, which has few viable water supply
options, to obtain a reliable, drought-safe supply of water. That interest is
clouded by the unconvincing conservation efforts of that metropolitan
region. Even though domestic use of the water would be largely nonconsumptive (landscape irrigation, in contrast, is not), holding the water
to replenish drought depleted reservoir levels cuts downstream flows so
much that Alabama industrial, navigational, and recreational uses suffer.
Similarly, depleted flows risk eradication of endangered sturgeon and
mussel species, while at the bottom of the basin, Florida depends on
sustained flows to modulate salinity levels in the estuary that are
necessary to protect its oystering industry and help sustain regional
tourism.
C. Sparta Aquifer: Mississippi and Tennessee (andas Many as Six Other
States)
The City of Memphis, Tennessee operates its own utilities, under the
auspices of the Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division (MLGW).28
Mississippi's29 complaint in its lawsuit alleges:
[A] substantial portion of Memphis' water supply comes from
high-quality aquifer ground water unlawfully diverted and
withdrawn by MLGW from underneath lands situated
exclusively within and belonging to Mississippi. MemphisMLGW is the largest pumper and user of Mississippi's ground
Over "The Hooch ": The Federal-InterstateWater Compact and the Resolution of Rights
in the ChattahoocheeRiver, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 200 (1992).
27. See cases cited supra note 25.
28. First Amended Complaint, % 5-6, Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis,
533 F. Supp. 2d 646 (N.D. Miss. 2006) (No. 2:05-cv-0032), 2006 WL 3853655
[hereinafter Mississippi Amended Complaint].
29. See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 533 F. Supp. 2d 646 (N.D.
Miss. 2008).
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water from wells and wellfields operated in and encompassed
within the Memphis area.30
Mississippi's complaint alleges that Memphis is now drawing sixty
mgd from a portion of the Sparta Aquifer 3 1 underlying Mississippi 32 and
that water is, in essence, Mississippi property.3 3 On that basis,
Mississippi claims damages for past conversion and seeks declaratory
and injunctive relief forbidding future misappropriation of Mississippi's
water.34 Despite taking on the mantle of parens patriae on behalf of its
citizens,35 the complaint alleges no specific harms to any Mississippi
individuals. Similarly, beyond its overarching claims relating to the
corpus of the water that give rise to common law tort claims, Mississippi
claims no specific violation of laws governing the withdrawal of water,
other than as a possible inference from a boilerplate assertion of lack of
right that includes a reference to lack of a permit to withdraw the water.36
Thus far, the lawsuit has been limited to procedural wrangling that
led to a dismissal for failure to join the State of Tennessee. The court
concluded that Tennessee was both "necessary" and "indispensible"
under its analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) and (b)
respectively.3 7 Assuming that ruling is upheld on appeal,38 a lawsuit
making Tennessee a party would have to be in the nature of an equitable

30. Id. 7.
31. For a general description of the Sparta Aquifer, see Sparta Fact Sheet, infra note
33.
32. Mississippi Amended Complaint, supra note 28, 16.
33. The aquifer underlies parts of Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Kentucky, Texas, and Alabama, but the principal areas are in only the first four
of those states. See The Sparta Aquifer: A Sustainable Water Resource, U.S. Geological
Survey, available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-111-02 (last visited Apr. 12, 2009)
[hereinafter Sparta Fact Sheet]. For an overview of the aquifer's characteristics, see
Mississippi Embayment Aquifer System, available at http://www.spartaaquifer.com/docs/missembayment.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
34. Id. 11-13.

35. Id. 3.
36. Id. 16, 19, 20, 29, 33, 42. Based on a search of Westlaw databases (MS-CS and
MS-STAT-ANN), there appear to be no reported cases under the Mississippi statutes
governing water use that involve groundwater withdrawals. See also 7 MS PRAC.
ENCYCLOPEDIA MS LAW § 63:68; see generally Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-5 (West 2008)
(imposing requirements for all water withdrawals).
37. Hood, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 650. Tennessee could not be joined because it refused to
waive its sovereign immunity.
38. There are strong reasons to argue the decision is incorrect. See infra note 85.
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apportionment and be lodged in the United States Supreme Court
pursuant to its original jurisdiction.3 9
III. GETTING INITIAL AGREEMENT OF SOVEREIGNS ENGAGED IN A
PRESENT WATER DISPUTE

One salient obstacle to achieving an interjurisdictional water
agreement among sovereigns is that entry into the agreement necessarily
entails some loss of sovereignty. Although it may seem counter-intuitive,
at a political and governance level, this perceived surrender of
sovereignty is a greater problem in interstate relations than it is in
international relations: it is easier for nations to make concessions of
sovereignty than it is for the several American states to do so. A second
major obstacle to entry into a dispute resolution system in the selected
interstate disputes, is the pendency of the controversy. When the dispute
is at hand, at least one party is likely to be in a position of power in
relation to the dispute, sometimes because that disputant can impose its
will as a physical matter, sometimes because that disputant can impose
its will through existing legal mechanisms. In those cases, entering a
management agreement is both a surrender of sovereignty and a
surrender of perceptible advantage. This section of the Article briefly
addresses the politics of surrendering sovereignty by giving a flavor to
the nature of the problem. The more extensive discussion focuses on lost
advantage. That discussion begins with the BWT as an example of a case
in which offsetting physical advantages were instrumental to reaching an
agreement in the first place. The discussion thereafter reviews the three
interstate disputes, in which there are not a parallel series of offsetting
advantages. Later sections of the Article will suggest that the political
hesitancy to surrender state sovereignty and the corresponding hesitancy
to surrender perceived advantage should be outweighed by the benefits
of having a fair and reliable interjurisdictional water resource agreement.
A. NationsActing Like Nations v. American States Acting Parochially
As described more fully below in the section on physical
advantage, 40 the United States and Canada were in a position to inflict on
39. The lack of specific claims of present injury to would-be Mississippi water users
who are deprived of water by Memphis' actions is a strong reason to argue that the Court
would not grant Mississippi leave to file a complaint at this time. That possibility would
be further enhanced if the Rule 19 dismissal of the current lawsuit is error. The pitfalls of
an equitable apportionment proceeding in this case are discussed infra at note 85.
40. See infra Part III.B.
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one another water management actions that might be described as
"mutually assured frustration" if the two nations did not agree on a
cooperative water management system. That alone is reason enough to
have joined in the BWT. In addition, however, there are other aspects of
their nationhood and economic relations that augered in favor of initial
entry into the BWT, which factors have promoted ongoing cooperation. 4'
First, both the United States and Canada are great and vast nations. They
act like nations; they have departments of state, they predicate their
behavior on the need to maintain good long-term diplomatic relations
with one another. That diplomatic cast, almost pompous in its manner,
engenders a degree of formality and civility in the nations' dealings with
one another. The several states, being a much smaller stage, often take a
more strident tone in their dealings. Water rivalries have frequently
prompted hotly partisan rhetoric, and absurdly bellicose threats, not
pallid diplomatic euphemisms. As an example, a New Jersey legislator
proposed recommissioning the battleship New Jersey for an attack on the
State of Delaware as part of the furor over a Delaware action that limited
a proposed New Jersey-based operation that extended into the Delaware
River that divides the two states.42 Similarly hostile comments have
punctuated the ACF dispute. For example, U.S. Rep. John Linder, RGeorgia, while commenting on the bona fides of Florida's position, is
quoted as saying: "What we've learned from this is what a blunt weapon
the Endangered Species Act has become, where some obscure bureaucrat
in Fish and Wildlife and some obscure judge can decide that mussels are
more important than our children and grandchildren. 43

41. See Shi-Ling Hsu & Austen L. Parrish, Litigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary
Harm: International Environmental Lawmaking and the Threat Of Extraterritorial
Reciprocity, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-14 (2007) [hereinafter Reciprocity].
42. New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1418-19 (2008). Additional public
threats included a reciprocal threat by Delaware to call out its militia to meet the
threatened attack, and New Jersey's threat to open an economic front in the dispute by
withdrawing its pension funds from Delaware banks. Id. The dispute was eventually
resolved in Delaware's favor on a boundary law issue by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1427.
43. Karyn Chenowyth, Georgia Gov. Sonny Perdue Declares State of Emergency,
MONSTERSANDCRITICS.COM, Oct. 20, 2007, available at http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/usa/news/article_ 1367125.php/Georgia Gov._SonnyPerduedeclares_
state-of emergency (last visited Apr. 12, 2009). Governor Sonny Perdue of Georgia had
made similar comments, he also criticized Florida's position, saying that
[u]tilizing the endangered species act as a weapon in this battle is somewhat
disingenuous. We know what this is about, we know its about the bay and the
quality of the bay and the oysters and that very powerful, very loud political
constituency. Let's don't try to make it about a federal law that really it's not
all about, about mussels or about sturgeons.

1644

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1635

Also moderating the level of tension between the two nations are
vast and vital economic ties that demand compromise in virtually all
settings, even those as contentions as water disputes. "Cooperation has
been, in many ways, essential because Canada and the United States are
strikingly interdependent. U.S.-Canada trade in services, cross-border
investments, and tourism surpasses $42 billion yearly." 44 Within the
United States, the several states economic ties to one another, though
sometimes strong and of great magnitude, are not ones that the state
governments can command. Put differently, states have very limited
power to affect one another's economic livelihood. The movement of
interstate commerce predominantly is a function of market conditions
and, to a degree, regulations imposed by the federal government and not
by the states. Even if a state government attempted to exercise its police
power authority in regulating commerce, retaliatory efforts to affect
commerce directed against another state are forbidden by the operation
of the "dormant" Commerce Clause of the federal constitution. 45 Thus,
the states lack the economic ties and the economic leverage that
promotes compromise.
The moderating factors that modulate U.S.-Canadian relations, in
general, do not exist in the domestic American interstate context. The
shared necessity that led the United States and Canada to negotiate so
balanced an agreement as the BWT seems to be absent in every one of
the three interstate settings. All three of the examples include in their
history an effort, even an excruciatingly extended effort in the case of the
ACF, to reach a negotiated agreement. All have failed to this point in
time. That history and the lack of political reward for "compromising
away" perceived sovereign prerogatives, make negotiating interstate
water agreements a difficult business. There are two different times of
opportunity, at the very pinnacle of a crisis and in the lull after the crisis
has receded. The time when negotiations are most difficult is the period
in which the unresolved present dispute is driving public sentiment
toward a hard-line position.
At the height of a crisis, such as a drought so severe that the salt
front of the Delaware River was within a few hundred feet of
Philadelphia's municipal supply intake,46 bargains can be struck.
Particularly in the context of the United States federal system, if an
Gov. Sonny Perdue Questions Fla. Argument in Water Wars, ACCESSNORTHGA.COM,
available at http://www.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=215180 (last visited Apr. 12,
2009).
44. Hsu & Parrish, Reciprocity, supra note 41, at 8.
45. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
46. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
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unresolved interstate water dispute threatens significant public health or
economic dislocations, the national government will impose a solution
that may be to no state's liking.4 7 The states in that setting may prefer to
put their own agreement in place. When a crisis has receded, for example
after the rains have come and the reservoirs are full, the strident politics
of the moment have passed and the desire for a better management
strategy in the future has a chance to take form. In that setting, to be
acceptable, an agreement in return for a surrender of sovereignty must
offer benefits that can be easily expressed and understood by the state's
legislators and citizens. The ability to combat out of basin diversions, for
example, was the kind of clear benefit that made entry into the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact 48 more
feasible for the compacting states. In fact, the greatest achievements of
that agreement reside in its management capacity, which was much
harder to promote to the legislatures and the general public.
B. The Problem of an Advantaged Party: Of Physicaland Legal
Advantages
The prospects for transferability of the BWT approach to the extant
Catawba, ACF, or Sparta Aquifer interjurisdictional water disputes are
diminished by the fact that in every case, at least one side or, perhaps
both, believe that the result of an agreement very likely will be less
favorable to them than relying on self help or a resort to judicial
intervention. The decisional calculus or operational principles
incorporated into a water management agreement will include features
that at least one of the prospective parties finds too favorable to the
opponent in the instant dispute. This is especially true with a BWT-like
decisional system that relies on consensus to function in an equal voting
and representation model. 49 The BWT model grants either party the
ability to stalemate action, which highlights the lost advantage that one
side believes it is obtaining from the status quo. 50 Thus, since both sides
must agree to enter into a shared governance relationship, it remains to
be seen why a sovereign would forego its perceived advantage and assent
to the agreement in the first place.

47. To a degree, this has happened in the ACF dispute. See supra Part ll.B.
48. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No.
110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008).
49. See BWT, supra note 1, arts. VII & VIII. See also infra Part IV.
50. See generally supra note 49.
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The BWT presents one example of foregone physical advantage, 5'
but it is a special case because the broad physical relationship of the
nations placed physical advantage with different parties in different
watersheds or even different parts of the same watershed. To a
considerable extent, the BWT grew out of a water controversy that was
touched off by a proposed United States dam and diversion project that
would supply water for agricultural use.5 2 At a very crude physical level,
in most interjurisdictional water allocation disputes, the upstream party
has the physical power to impose its will on the downstream party.
Absent a treaty or an interjurisdictional tribunal authorized to allocate the
resource, that physically superior position provides the upstream party
with little incentive to compromise or to enter into a legally binding
sharing agreement. 53 Unlike the typical setting, however, the dispute that
helped precipitate the adoption of the BWT was one in which both
nations had the physical power to adversely affect the other-one of the
rivers in question crossed the border first in one direction and then in the
other.
To be more specific, in 1903, the United States proposed to divert
water from the St. Mary River into the Milk River in Montana before
those rivers flowed into the Canadian Province of Alberta.54 The
Canadians on the St. Mary River strenuously opposed the plan, but
invoking the then-current Harmon Doctrine,5 5 the United States
proceeded with preparations for the planned diversion. 56 In response, the
Canadian government announced that it was approving the application of
51. With independent nations that have not entered into a treaty on the subject, there
is not a system of legal arrangements that could provide an enforceable legal advantage to
one party or the other.
52. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
53. On the domestic level in the United States, since there are background principles
of interstate water allocation that favor the earlier developing state, the party with the
advantage under those principles may not be the party with the physical advantage. See
Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310 (1984). For a more complete description of
those principles, see generally A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES

(2008).
54. For a concise retelling of the story of the Milk River and its role in the adoption of
the BWT, see, for example, Tom Perkins, National Water and Climate Center, NRCS
Snow Survey Centennial Celebration, at 5-6, available at ftp://ftp.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/downloads/centennial/article3820061218.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
55. Named after the then-Secretary of State Judson Harmon, the doctrine is
exemplified by the position of the United States in the case of United States v. Texas, 162
U.S. 1 (1896). The gist of the doctrine, now repudiated, was that the rules, principles and
precedents of international law imposed no liability or obligation on the United States to
let parts of the waters that were diverted upstream by the United States flow to Mexico
(or Canada). See id.
56. Perkins, supra note 54, at 6.
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a Milk-to-St. Mary River diversion in its territory, which would have
negated the benefits of the American project, since the American
project's potentially benefitted lands were even further downstream, after
the Milk had turned southward and flowed back into the United States.57
Against this backdrop, the United States both altered the project to
protect the Canadian interests on the St. Mary River and took the further
step of entering into the BWT, in at least partial recognition of the need
for compromise given the superior physical position of Canada over
some of the trans-border water resources.5 8
The Milk-St. Mary dispute is not an isolated instance in which
Canada holds "upstream power," slightly more than half of the
waterways flowing across the 5000 mile U.S.-Canadian border flow from
Canada to the United States. 59 This parity of physical power creates an
ideal situation for a commitment to compromise on a more or less equal
basis: both parties have the ability to take domestic actions that could
impose significant negative consequences on its neighbor across the
border. This fact alone tends to distinguish the BWT from the domestic
American settings where its application might be beneficial. In at least
two of those disputes there is a party that either is physically dominant,
or has a legal advantage. In both of those cases, the neighbor for whom
the current status quo is more beneficial will be reluctant to bargain away
its perceived advantage.
The American domestic conflict that best exemplifies a case of the
physically superior position is the Catawba River dispute. North Carolina
is upstream and has the power to dam and divert the water before it
reaches South Carolina. 60 As exemplified by the history of the BWT, it is
equally salient that the regional topography places North Carolina
upstream of South Carolina on all significant interstate watercourses they
share. 6 ' Under that scenario, it is difficult to discern any strong reason for
North Carolina to compromise or agree to a parity-based water allocation
and management agreement like that of the BWT.

57. Id.
58. See Albert Utton, Canadian International Waters, in 5 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 50.01, at 53-56 (Robert Beck, ed., repl. Vol. 1998). See also BWT, supra note
1, art. VI (addressing, specifically, the Milk-St.Mary matter).
59. David G. Lemarquand, Preconditions to Cooperation in Canada-UnitedStates
Boundary Waters, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 221, 223 (1986).
60. Under the background principles of interstate water allocation law, North
Carolina also enjoys the advantage of being the earlier developing economic user of the
water, which creates a legal advantage. See generally TARLOCK, supra note 53.
61. See Part II.A.
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The American domestic conflict that best exemplifies a case of the
legally superior position is the ACF Basin dispute. 62 As already noted,
this dispute has taken on the character of a legal wrestling match over
events at the upstream end of the basin.6 3 The upstream state, Georgia is
not in a position to take physical control of the water it claims is needed
for Atlanta's municipal supply because that water is already under the
effective control of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
through its operation of the Buford Dam and the associated reservoir,
Lake Lanier. 64 Here, efforts at negotiation and compromise are long past.
The basin states spent more than a decade seriously attempting to reach a
compromise. 65 They even entered into an interstate compact in which
they agreed to pursue a process that would lead to agreement.66 Once that
process failed, the states' energies shifted back to a competition in which
each state's goal is to require the Corps to operate its dams in the basin in
a manner favorable to them.6 7 As one state (Georgia) and then the others
(Florida and Alabama) 68 gain an ascendant legal position, that side's
willingness to negotiate a compromise seems to evaporate.
This phenomenon, where the legally ascendant party scuttles
negotiations, was on display in the ACF controversy in late 2007 and
early 2008. The basin was again being gripped by a severe drought. As
that period began, Georgia held the upper hand: it had engineered a
settlement and consent decree in the suit brought by the hydropower
interests against the Corps over the operations at Buford Dam. 69 The
Corps had been allocating additional storage to municipal supply to the
detriment of hydroelectric generation. 70 The increased storage and
subsequent delivery to Atlanta harmed the pecuniary interest of a group
comprised of purchasers of the comparatively inexpensive hydropower
62. See Part lI.B.
63. See id.
64. Alabama, 424 F.3d at 1122.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. In the main, Georgia is aligned against the two other states. Alabama and Florida
have similar, but nevertheless distinct objectives for the management of the basin's water.
For example, Alabama is benefitted by a flow regime that holds water in the basin's midsection for power plant cooling and maintaining navigation and flatwater recreation,
whereas Florida wants that same water released in a way that mirrors the natural
hydrograph and ensures adequate flushing of Apalachicola Bay to prevent a change in its
salinity level. See, e.g., Abrams, Water Federalism, supra note 25; Robert Abrams,
Settlement of the ACF Controversy: Sisyphus at the Dawn of the 21st Century, HAMLINE
L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter ACF Controversy].
69. Alabama, 424 F.3d at 1124.
70. Id.
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who claimed a violation of contractual rights. 71 By offering the
hydropower interests what amounted to financial concessions, the
District of Columbia consent decree had paved the way for the Corps'
increased deliveries of water for municipal use to continue. Thus,
Georgia was bargaining from a position of power backed by the consent
decree and an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision that set aside a
preliminary injunction issued by the Alabama United States District
Court that would have prohibited the Corps from acting in reliance on the
consent decree.72
On a different legal front, the 2007 drought had led to several
attempts by Florida to invoke the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to
require the Corps to operate the dams differently.73 The need for a Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) biological opinion and an apparent federal
desire for a compromise solution brought Secretary of the Interior
Kempthorne into the fray. Drawing on his western states water
background, he was serving as a facilitator of tri-state negotiations.
Georgia, with its recent legal victories was reluctant to offer
concessions.74 Georgia's hand was further strengthened because the
Corps' Interim Operating Plan (IOP) for the basin, which had the
approval of the Fish and Wildlife Service as ESA-compliant, favored
Georgia. 75 The ESA set the absolute minimum downstream release
obligation of the Corps, and the lOP gave the endangered sturgeon and
mussels extremely little in comparison to what Florida and Alabama
were claiming was necessary to prevent extinction.76 Thus, as a legal
matter, the status quo was the best severe drought result Georgia could
possibly attain.
Secretary Kempthorne, however, continued to pursue negotiations
with the three state governors trying to achieve consensus on a long-term
operating plan.77 According to the public statements, some progress was
71. Id.
72. The pending lawsuits were not dismissed, and Alabama and Florida were allowed
to file amended complaints. Id. at 1135-36.
73. Meruelo, supra note 26, at 348.
74. Id. at 350.
75. Id. at 349.
76. Id.
77. It is possible to speculate that the items Secretary Kempthome was seeking to
negotiate were not related to the extreme drought scenario. On that issue, Secretary
Kempthorne was almost certain to support the FWS position about what was necessary.
A revised long term operating plan also would address efforts to manage the reservoirs in
wetter years in a way that would make the system better prepared for droughts when they
occurred. Politically, however, the extreme low flow scenarios were more critical to the
states because of the prevailing drought condition and the possibility that climate change
might make drought more common or even endemic.
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being made, when suddenly the legal tables turned.78 The consent decree
in the hydropower case had been on appeal in the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals. On February 5, 2008, the decision in
Southeastern Federal Power Consumers, Inc., v. Geren not only
invalidated the consent decree, it found that the Corps needed express
congressional authorization to continue to allocate so much storage space
in Lake Lanier to municipal supply. 79 Just as quickly, the shoe was on
the other foot, and now Florida and Alabama were unwilling to agree to
proposals on the table because the legal position taken by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals put them in the legally advantaged
position. 80 Absent some new legal development, the Corps was not
allowed to hold so much water in storage for municipal supply, which
meant other authorized purposes of the several dams, including
hydropower, navigation, and recreation, would be more prominent in
Corps operations and serving those purposes would lead to greater
releases. The ink was not dry on the ruling when Governor Riley of
Alabama issued a press release on February 5, 2008, in which he
proclaimed that "[t]he ruling invalidates the massive water grab that
Georgia tried to pull off."81 A February 15 meeting of the three states
failed to reach an agreement, after which the Alabama-Florida position
hardened around their newfound legal victory.82 When on March 1,
2008, the negotiations broke down, Secretary Kempthorne, in a
somewhat testy public statement, discontinued the process and indicated
that he would see to it that a permanent operating plan was in place by
June of 2008.83
Both the Catawba and the ACF present the problem of an advantaged
party (or a party that perceives itself as advantaged) being unwilling to
agree to a negotiated settlement, far less to an equality-based regime like
that of the BWT. The Sparta/Memphis Sands Aquifer dispute is not as
78. Id.
79. Se. Fed. Power Consumers, Inc., v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
80. See id.
81. Press Release of Governor Bob Riley (Feb. 5, 2008), available at
http://govemorpress.alabama.gov/pr/pr-2008-02-05-0 1-water war win.asp (last visited
Apr. 12, 2009).
82. By February 27, 2008--even before the March 1, 2008 extended deadline for tristate negotiations-the head of the Atlanta Regional Commission stated that "[i]t
has
been reported that the Governor of Alabama has informed all parties that he will not
continue to negotiate and is ready to go to court with regard to the ACT. We anticipate he
will follow suit with the ACF." Atlanta Regional Commission Minutes (Feb. 27, 2008),
available at www.atlantaregional.com/documents/dr-arc-boardnotes0227-08(1).pdf
(last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
83. See Letter from Dick Kempthorne, Secretary of Interior (Mar. 1, 2008), available
at http://www.doi.gov/news/08_NewsReleases/08030 1.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
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easily cast as one in which there is a clearly advantaged party, either
physically or legally. 84 What seems to be the opening posture of the
parties is that Memphis (and presumably Tennessee) feels it is
advantaged by the status quo: it is taking low cost, high quality water
from the aquifer with apparent impunity due to its ability to fend off this
initial attempt at legal redress. Correspondingly, Mississippi feels itself
aggrieved by that course of action and Mississippi apparently believes it
has a legally advantaged position stemming from its property interest in
the groundwater. With the Rule 19 dismissal of its case, Mississippi has
suffered a temporary legal setback, but Mississippi appears to believe
that it can obtain a judicial forum either with a successful appeal of the
presently pending suit or an original jurisdiction suit in the Supreme
Court.8 ' There is not likely to be serious settlement discussion or any
prospect for a BWT/IJC type governance arrangement in the near term
future if the parties continue to adhere to their current strategies.
Physically, the nature of the groundwater resource negates an easyto-visualize physical advantage analysis similar to the superiority
upstream position on a surface water course. The movement of water in
aquifers is more complex than in typical surface water systems.86
Aquifers are largely unseen-most knowledge of them is gleaned from
widely spaced data points (wells), collected core samples, and controlled
small scale short term tests of transmissivity that are used to construct
models of how water is stored in the aquifer and how it moves in
response to pumping. Most basically, even without any real knowledge
of hydrogeology, it is plain that pumping draws water toward the well
and distorts the natural movement of the groundwater in the aquifer.
For a period in United States water law, the underground movement
of water before it was pumped or came to the surface was treated as
inscrutable and unknowable.8 7 The person who "captured" the water at
84. See Part II.C.
85. Tracing out those two paths is beyond the scope of this Article. In this author's
opinion, however, the Rule 19 dismissal is inappropriate because full relief can be given
between the two parties present in the litigation without prejudice to the rights of others,
most notably the State of Tennessee. The overarching nature of an equitable
apportionment, were one ever to be held, ensures that Tennessee's rights are not at risk in
this lawsuit. See Robert Abrams, Secure Water Rights in Interstate Waters, in WATER
LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond
eds., 1995). Moreover, there is venerable precedent for interstate water conflict
adjudication in cases not involving states as parties. See Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485
(1911).
86. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS 24 (1992). An important
corollary of this fact is that to create a clear idea of groundwater movement, "[t]he
information requirements are enormous." Id. at 25.
87. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 534 (1855).
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the surface was deemed its owner, and the doctrine took on the name the
absolute ownership rule.88 As pumping technology improved, and a
stronger pump could pull the water away from a weaker pump, this
doctrine was also labeled "the law of the biggest pump. ' 89 The more
precise description would be that if two wells are pumping from the same
aquifer, the larger pump will prevail once the influence of the two wells
intersects. So while almost all states have abandoned the absolute
ownership doctrine as their groundwater law, as a matter of physical
advantage, the larger pump still wins and gives a degree of physical
advantage. 90
This aspect of wells and aquifers has potential consequences for the
Memphis-Mississippi groundwater dispute. The United States Geological
Survey (USGS) has undertaken several studies of the Sparta Aquifer. 9 1
The primary focus and modeling in these efforts has been directed at
overuse of the aquifer in Arkansas, where unsustainable pumping of the
shallower alluvial aquifer by rice farmers on the Grand Prairie has
caused many of those farmers to start pumping the higher quality Sparta
Aquifer water. 92 This change in irrigation source water has, in turn,
created an overdraft pattern 93 in the Sparta Aquifer that threatens to
deprive many Arkansas communities of their best source of drinking
water. 94

88. See JOSEPH

SAX, BARTON THOMPSON, JR., JOHN LESHY & ROBERT ABRAMS, LEGAL

CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES

415 (4th ed. 2006).

89. Id. at 417-20 (4th ed. 2006).
90. The advantage lasts, at least until the competing groundwater pumper enlarges
his/her pump.
91. See, e.g., T.P. Schrader, PotentiometricSurface in the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer of
the Mississippi Embayment, United States Geological Survey (2007), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3014/pdf/sim3014.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
92. See, e.g., Paul McKee & Brian Clark, Development and Calibrationof a GroundWater Flow Model for the Sparta Aquifer of Southeastern Arkansas and North-Central
Louisiana and Simulated Response to Withdrawals, 1998-2027, at 8 (2003), availableat
http://pubs.usgs.gov/wri/wri03-4132 (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
93. Overdraft occurs when the amount of water withdrawn from an aquifer exceeds
the amount of water recharged to the aquifer. Analogous to the way in which a bank
account declines when withdrawals exceed deposits, in an aquifer the potentiometric
surface (water table) declines during overdraft. If the overdraft continues, the water table
will fall below the bottom of some wells and those wells will fail. Eventually, even with
deeper wells, the aquifer will be drained, or the cost of pumping the water will become so
great that it is no longer worth producing.
94. See, e.g., David A. Freiwald & Sherrel F. Johnson, Monitoring of SpartaAquifer
Recovery in Southern Arkansas and Northern Louisiana 2003-47, United States
Geological Survey (2007), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3102 (last visited
Apr. 12,2009).
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A similar competition for groundwater could arise between
Mississippi irrigation and Memphis' municipal use in that portion of the
Sparta Aquifer. There is no indication given in the pending litigation
materials of the extent of agricultural irrigation from the Sparta Aquifer
in the vicinity of the Memphis wellfields. 95 Nevertheless, the aquifer's
high rate of hydraulic conductivity and productiveness 96 make the
aquifer a target of opportunity for high volume pumping that typically
attends agricultural use. The amount of water needed for irrigation of
crops dwarfs the amount of water used for municipal supply. As an
example, a single six mile on a side square farm growing rice in the
region would almost certainly pump more water in a growing season
than the sixty mgd that Memphis allegedly "misappropriates"
from
97
beneath the Mississippi side of the state line in an entire year.
Although such pumping is physically and theoretically possible, the
absence of any mention of irrigation in the litigation is an indication not
very much is taking place at this time. As climate change increases
summer temperatures and alters precipitation patterns to more intense
rainfall events and more frequent periods of drought, that inferred lack of
irrigation from that portion of the Sparta Aquifer may end. 98 If interstate
competition for the Sparta water emerges, attention will return to the
legal rules that will apply in an interstate groundwater apportionment and
which state is likely to be advantaged by the likely result.
At present, there are no definitive precedents allocating interstate
groundwater, although there are several indications that groundwater
would be subject to equitable apportionment using the same standards as
surface water. 99 Were an equitable apportionment initiated, a first order
of business would be to consider what impact, if any, Mississippi's claim
of ownership is likely to have on the proceedings. On this issue, the

95. See Mississippi Amended Complaint, supra note 28.
96. See Sparta Fact Sheet, supra note 31.
97. The calculation is as follows: 1 mgd = 1120 acre feet per year, so Memphis' 60
mgd = 67,200 acre feet per year. A farm of 36 square miles contains 23,040 acres. Rice
grows submerged, so even in a warm humid climate, a water duty of 3 acre-feet per acre
would be reasonable (low, in fact) and would require 69,120 acre-feet of water. That
water duty amounts to only one and one-half inches per week over a 24-week growing
season, which would be a conservative figure considering the amount of water that would
evaporate and the amount that would infiltrate into the soil, not to mention the amount
that is evapotranspirated by the plants. Seepage would not recharge the Sparta Aquifer,
which is confined in that part of its expanse. See Sparta Fact Sheet, supra note 31, Fig. 1.
98. See Noah Hall, Brent Stuntz & Robert Abrams, Climate Change and Freshwater
Resources, 22 NAT.

RESOURCES

& ENv'T 30 (2008).

99. See SAX, ET AL., supra note 88, at 872-73 (citing cases). Cf Idaho v. Oregon, 444
U.S. 380 (1980) (discussing equitable apportionment of anadromous fish runs).
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influence of the Sporhasel°° dormant commerce clause case would
undermine the Mississippi position. Even if the groundwater underlying
Mississippi lands in its natural setting is property of Mississippi,
Mississippi cannot embargo its export,' 10 especially in the absence of any
showing of particularized harm, which is a key element in equitable
apportionment cases. 10 2 The Mississippi "ownership" position is further
undercut by its implicit reliance on a static view of water in an aquifer.
Groundwater "flows" within an aquifer. In the Sparta Aquifer, studies
have shown water moves from the high ground recharge areas at the
edges of the aquifer toward the centerline of the Mississippi Embayment,
where the Sparta is at its deepest levels. 0 3 Other than this general
movement of water, the other groundwater flow characteristic of the
Sparta Aquifer in the Memphis area has long been the influence of
pumping.104 One report states: "Flow in the Memphis aquifer has been
transient since the onset of pumping in 1886. Recharge occurs in the
outcrop area in the southeastern and eastern parts of the study area, and
05
flow is predominantly into the centers of pumping from all directions."
At present, Arkansas, which overlies the Sparta Aquifer to the west
of the current pumping dispute, is not being affected by the pumping in
the Memphis area. A schematic cross section of the Mississippi
Embayment, shows that the Sparta Aquifer dips significantly in the
center, roughly having its deepest notch under the thread of the

100. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941.
101. Justice Stevens' opinion in Sporhase held out a possibility of restriction that
appears to be unavailable to Mississippi. "A demonstrably arid State conceivably might
be able to marshal evidence to establish a close means-end relationship between even a
total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and preserve water. "Id.
at 958.
102. See Colorado v. New Mexico 1, 459 U.S. 176. See infra note 107 and
accompanying text.
103. Mississippi Embayment Aquifer System, supra note 33.
104. On the western side of the midline of the embayment in Arkansas, there also is a
southerly component to the flow. Sparta Fact Sheet, supra note 31. If that same southerly
movement of water was also present on the eastern side of the embayment, that would
mean portions of the groundwater found under Mississippi would be water that had
previously been found beneath Tennessee. That flow pattern further supports Memphis
and Tennessee because the zone of source water for the MLGW will lie mostly to the
north of the wells.
105. J.V. Brahana & R.E. Broshears, Hydrogeology and Ground-Water Flow in the
Memphis and Fort Pillow Aquifers in the Memphis Area, Tennessee, at 23, United States
Geological Survey (2001), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/wri/wri894131/pdf/wri89-4131.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
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Mississippi River itself.'0 6 That shape explains why most studies focus
on one side of the river or the other, since there are yet to be instances in
which the potentiometric surface (water table) of the Sparta has dropped
sufficiently for water to be drawn across the centerline of the aquifer
from one side of the embayment to the other.
WE:ST

EAST

NOTATO SCALE

With the Mississippi property claim out of the way, the next exercise
is to anticipate how the Supreme Court would view the MemphisMississippi dispute under equitable apportionment doctrine. The current
methodology is set out in Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in the
first of two rulings on the Vermejo River dispute between Colorado and
New Mexico. ]°7 As a threshold matter, "a state seeking to prevent or
enjoin a diversion by another state bears the burden of proving that the
diversion will cause it real or substantial injury or damage."' 1 8 In the
Vermejo case, the Court found New Mexico had made that showing
because it had persuaded the Court it was already using the entire flow of
the river so that any diminution of flow would cause it injury. 10 9 The
Mississippi complaint in its pending lawsuit offers no allegations of
injury caused by lack of water that it would otherwise be using," 0 and
for that reason, if there are not other facts that were not alleged by
Mississippi, Tennessee would prevail in an equitable apportionment case.

106. See Sparta Fact Sheet, supra note 31, Fig. 2 (showing generalized schematic of
geohydrologic west-east cross section illustrating trough-like appearance of embayment
and generalized flow directions).
107. Colorado v. New Mexico 1,459 U.S. 176.
108. Id. at 187 n. 13 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
109. This factual predicate was challenged in extensive detail by Justice Stevens. See
Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. at 325-339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. See Mississippi Amended Complaint, supra note 28.
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IV.A PICTURE So BLEAK THAT EVEN A STUBBORN STATE MIGHT
COMPROMISE

Even if the outcome of equitable apportionment litigation in the
groundwater context can be predicted,"' there is reason to anticipate that
litigation is a Prisoner's Dilemma in which all parties lose by playing,
and in which any victories won will be Phyrric victories. That dour
prediction stems from two divergent lines of argument, inconclusiveness
and cost, that can be exemplified by following the history of the
Arkansas River dispute between Kansas and Colorado, the case that
introduced the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Reviewing the
history of that case is particularly appropriate as part of a celebration of
the 100th anniversary of the BWT-the two are of kindred age and spirit.
As with the BWT, Justice Brewer's conception of the interstate dispute
placed a remarkable emphasis on equal and reciprocal sovereignty. "One
cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states to each other, is
that of equality of right.""' 2 Litigation to settle the Arkansas River
dispute was first brought to the United States Supreme Court on May 20,
1901113 and initially ruled upon by the Court in 1907.
In the first plenary equitable apportionment decision, the Court held
that Kansas had not shown sufficient injury at the hands of the upstream
diversions made in Colorado. 1 4 The Court, however, noting that its
determination was equitable in nature and dependant on the facts
presented, made it clear that over time the equities might change and
become such that Kansas would be entitled to a decree. 15 Justice
Brewer's opinion states:
The decree will also dismiss the bill of the state of Kansas as
against all the defendants, without prejudice to the right of the
plaintiff to institute new proceedings whenever it shall appear
that, through a material increase in the depletion of the waters of
the Arkansas by Colorado, its corporations or citizens, the
111. See Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310. But see Kansas v.Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907). See also Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation, supra note 25 (describing
the current legal "bias" of Colorado v. New Mexico 11 in favor of interstate water
allocation to support existing development over allocation favoring potential future water
development and its contrast with more traditional policies of equality among states
typified by Kansas v. Colorado, the Court's first equitable apportionment case).
112. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97.
113. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 126 (1902) (granting leave to proceed with
the bill in equity).
114. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 117.
115. Id.
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substantial interests of Kansas are being injured to the extent of
destroying the equitable apportionment of benefits between the
two states resulting from the flow of the river. 116
The dispute was reprised mid-century, when Kansas again claimed
overuse upstream in Colorado and was again heard on the merits and
rebuffed by the Court." 7 This time, the Court pointedly suggested that
the parties ought to enter into an interstate compact. The reasoning of
Justice Roberts in urging that form of resolution bears quotation in full:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights
of states in such cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such
disputes, they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present
complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of
future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration
rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such
controversies may appropriately be composed by negotiation and
agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal
constitution. We say of this case, as the court has said of
interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual
accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the
medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our adjudicatory
power. 18
The states followed the suggestion that they enter into a compact, 9
but by 1995, Kansas was again complaining, this time alleging that
Colorado's groundwater pumping activities were causing violations of
Kansas' rights under the compact. 120 Owing to the complex hydrological
issues involved, the case featured an immense amount of controversy
over expert modeling of the movement of groundwater and its discharge
to surface water. Almost absurdly to the legal ear, an important part of
the Supreme Court decision reads as follows: "Because the Spronk
method for determining 'usable' river flows [resulting after groundwater
pumping depletions] was less compatible with Kansas' hydrological
model than the other methods proposed, we conclude that the Special

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Kansas v. Colorado, 320 U.S. 383 (1943), reh'gdenied 321 U.S. 803 (1944).
Id. at 392 (footnotes omitted).
Arkansas River Compact, 63 Stat. 145 (1949).
See Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995).
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Master properly rejected the Spronk method in' 12favor
of the Durbin
1
approach, as modified by the Larson coefficients."
This time around, the Court ruled that Kansas had shown unlawful
depletion of the water reaching Kansas and ordered the case back to the
Special Master to fashion a remedy. The case returned to the Court in
2001 where the Special Master's remedial determinations were
upheld. 122 When it seemed the case was finally at an end (Colorado had
already paid a monetary award of more than $34 million in lieu of
making up the past depletions in kind) a final dispute cropped up related
to taxing costs. In particular, the parties disagreed about the amount of
taxable costs that would be allowed for expert witness fees for their days
of attendance at hearings before the Special Master. 123 Colorado is
seeking application of a very specific provision of the Judicial Code that
states, "a witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each
day's attendance."'' 24 Over the 270 days of hearings before the Special
Master, there was a considerable amount of expert testimony. The parties
had already agreed that if the statutory limit applies, Kansas would be
entitled to $162,927.94. 125 Kansas, however, is seeking an actual cost
figure for expert-witness attendance which amounts to $9,214,727.81, a
difference of $9,051,799.87.126 The figure is almost shocking on its own
account. It is even more shocking when it is remembered that this is not
the total cost to Kansas of its expert witnesses, just the cost for days of
attendance at hearings. This figure does not include Colorado's experts at
all. This figure does not even suggest how much other expense might be
involved for attorneys and in-house staff that are not experts. 127 All of
this expense was incurred to obtain a judgment of $34 million for
underdeliveries of water that occurred over a two decade period. 128 The
cost of the water war almost certainly exceeded the value of the water
over which it was fought.
Litigating the equitable apportionment of the Sparta Aquifer likely
would not be as messy as litigating the impacts of groundwater
withdrawals on the flow of the Arkansas River. Even so, if the depletion
121. Id.at 686-87.
122. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001).
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2008).
124. 28 U.S.C. 1821(b) (2008).
125. See Robert Abrams, How Much Can Be Charged for Expert-Witness Appearance
Fees inInterstate Water Litigation?, 2008-09 PREVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT CASES, Issue 3, at 188-90 (2008).
126. See id.
127. See Joseph Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States
and the Struggle Over the 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 888-89 (2005).
128. See Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. at 9 n.2.
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of the aquifer becomes a serious matter that draws in several of the
aquifer states, this is litigation that no state wants. The Arkansas River
litigation and its three trips to the Supreme Court ought to serve as a
cautionary tale-a negotiated agreement that guarantees mutual respect
and offers a predictable and reasoned outcome might be far preferable to
ccwinning" a protracted legal battle that is subject to being rekindled as
conditions change. Equitable apportionment is inordinately costly and
often remains inconclusive. Even the winner of such a Pyrrhic victory
ought to prefer a fair and lasting water allocation and management
agreement.
V. WHAT ELEMENTS THE BWT MIGHT OFFER To LASTING WATER
CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Thus far, very little has been said about how the BWT actually
addresses interjurisdictional water allocation disputes. Articles VII
through X are of primary interest. Article VII establishes the IJC and sets
the principle of equality in place by fixing its membership at six
commissioners, three appointed by each government.129 Article VIII
announces the primary substantive principles that the commissioners are
to apply. In part, it states as follows:
This International Joint Commission shall have jurisdiction over
and shall pass upon all cases involving the use or obstruction or
diversion of the waters with respect to which under Articles III
and IV of this treaty the approval of this Commission is required,
and in passing upon such cases the Commission shall be
governed by the following rules or principles which are adopted
by the High Contracting Parties for this purpose:
The High Contracting Parties shall have, each on its own
side of the boundary, equal and similar rights in the use of the
waters herein-before defined as boundary waters.
The following order of precedence shall be observed among
the various uses enumerated hereinafter for these waters, and no
use shall be permitted which tends materially to conflict with or
restrain any other use which is given preference over it in this
order of precedence:
(1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes;
129. BWT, supranote 1, art. VII.
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(2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the
purposes of navigation;
(3) Uses for power and for irrigation purposes.
The foregoing provisions shall not apply to or disturb any
existing uses of boundary waters on either side of the boundary..
The majority of the Commissioners shall have power to render a
decision. In case the Commission is evenly divided upon any
question or matter presented to it for decision, separate reports
shall be made by the Commissioners on each side to their own
Government. The High Contracting Parties shall thereupon
endeavor to agree upon an adjustment of the question or matter
of difference, and if an agreement is reached between them, it
shall be reduced to writing in the form of a protocol, and shall be
communicated to the Commissioners, who shall take such
as may be necessary to carry out such
further proceedings
130
agreement.
Article IX allows either government to make a reference to the IJC
on boundary issues and the IJC is "to examine into and report upon the
facts and circumstances of the particular questions and matters referred,
together with such conclusions and recommendations as may be
appropriate .. .. ,,13Article X allows the HC to resolve questions
referred by the "consent of the two Parties." 132 This allows the use of the
IJC as a decision maker in cases not ordinarily within its Article VIII
jurisdiction. This provision has never been used, 133 whereas the Article
has been a major element
IX referrals for reporting and recommendations
34
in the IJC's work over the years.1
Standing back from the BWT/UC arrangement, as an
interjurisdictional water management agreement it incorporates a small
number of key elements that might have transferrable application to other
interjurisdictional water management settings:

130. Id. art. VIII.
131. Id. art. IX.
132. Id. art. X.
133. See Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and
Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 706 (2007).
134. See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 405, 418 (2006).
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" Equal decisional authority to each participating sovereign 35
o Tie votes take no action, but separate reports are made to each
government, which then try to resolve the issue at that level
* Decisional
jurisdiction over navigation under a principle of equal
13 6
access

* Decisional jurisdiction
over diversion (allocation) subject to a
137
priorities
use
of
series
* Domestic and sanitary
* Navigation
* Power and irrigation
* Specific
provisions for Niagara 38 and the Milk-St. Mary
1 39
dispute
e Grandfathering of uses existing at the time of treaty formation
140
e Reference jurisdiction for study and reporting

One non-legislated feature of the BWT/IJC of note is the reputation
the IJC and its staff have earned for scientific excellence and objectivity
in the study and reporting process. In recent years, the IJC has also
adopted processes that ensure broad public participation and
transparency. 14' In the water dispute arena, which is politically charged
and where decisions can be of immense economic and ecological
importance, these characteristics build credibility for the process and in
obtaining support for potentially unpopular decisions.
The most fundamental principle of the BWT is equality, most
obviously manifested by the equal representation and voting power of
each nation on the IJC.142 That aspect of the BWT decisional process is
among the most difficult to transfer to governance in the interstate
context, and doing so would be problematic. The interstate disputes are
135. But, supra note I arts. VII & VIII.
136. Id. art. I.
137. Id. art. VIII.
138. Id. art. V. The allocation of the hydroelectric benefits was important enough to be
addressed in the treaty itself.
139. Id. art. VI.
140. Id. art. IX.
141. See International Joint Commission, Ninth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water
Quality (Perspective and Orientation--Communication and Public Participation) (1998),
availableat http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/9br/achievee.html#pers (last visited
Apr. 12, 2009).
142. BWT, supra note 1, art. VII.
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manifestations of a failure to be able to achieve a consensus. To be sure,
having a respected IJC-like body involved from the outset might avoid
serious disputes in many cases, but even a single case of impasse where
one state then takes advantage of the other's inability to obtain relief is
one case too many. The BWT process for equally divided votes, reports
accompanying a de facto remand to the governments,143 is not likely to
achieve a compromise when the jointly operated expert agency has failed
to achieve a consensus position and reported their differences to their
respective governments. The future credibility and authority of the
governance mechanism suffers. In the state frustrated by the impasse the
agreement and its processes will be perceived as ineffective at the most
important thing it was charged with doing, solving hard water allocation
problems fairly. The realistic alternative is to give the governing
commission final decisional authority, under a decision making
procedure that does not permit impasse.
The other bedrock element of the BWT/IJC framework is the clearly
enunciated decisional principles that are announced in advance. This
element is not only transferrable; it is mandatory. Setting the decisional
standard is the one effort that holds a possibility for uniting the states and
bringing them into an agreement-in several regards it is relatively easy
to agree on what uses of water are most important, after which it is not
difficult to construct a principled way to make decisions that implement
the agreed priorities.
Water disputes generate emotional responses because of the role of
water in the human sense of place, the survival and functioning of
society, and the ecosystem that supports it. It is possible to set priorities
for water use that are capable of winning broad assent across
jurisdictional lines. 144 In setting specific priorities, the BWT list is not a
model for most twenty-first century domestic United States interstate
water allocation disputes. The BWT's high priority for navigation makes
sense in the context of both the era of its formation and the resource base
involved, given the immense importance of the Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River system as highways of commerce. In this day and age,
an age of interstate highways, and comprehensive transcontinental rail
systems, navigation may have a place in a hierarchy of uses, but it will be
lower than it was in 1909. If water is scarce, other uses are likely to be
more important because the cargo can move by other means.

143. Id. art. VIII.
144. For an effort to do so, see Robert Abrams and Noah Hall, Framing Water Policy
in a Carbon Affected and Carbon ConstrainedEnvironment (forthcoming 2009) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Framing].
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The BWT priorities are flawed as a contemporary model in other
ways. The BWT priorities do not even mention the role of water in
sustaining natural systems, a cardinal omission. When vital ecological
functions are threatened, they fall just below domestic use in the
hierarchy. Similarly, the BWT's equation of power with irrigation is too
lacking in guidance. In the passage of a century since 1909, the role of
energy in the economy has been a driver that has raised standards of
living, its efficient use will be a part of global competitiveness, its
reformation to be less carbon dependant is a matter of global necessity
and national security. 145 By contrast, most irrigation, the largest water
consuming activity, is of relatively low value, much of it supporting vast
farming enterprises that grow forage crops to feed livestock, or
commodity crops that are made profitable by governmental subsidies. To
the extent that food and fiber are essential and irrigation supports their
production, the United States has many humid regions where most of the
same crops can be grown with little or no irrigation and without the
attendant competition for water where water is truly scarce. More
bluntly, energy generation activities should outrank irrigation.
Urging that the priorities of the BWT should not be those installed as
the guideposts of modern water allocation decision making is not
intended as a criticism of them in their time and context. Instead, their
lack of rote transferability is a vivid illustration of the fact that the role of
water, and society's understanding of that role has changed over in the
past century. Rather than being a reason to dismiss the lessons of the
BWT, that mutability is a reason to understand that allocative principles
embedded in a lasting framework water allocation agreement should
have an internal mechanism for renewal and modification. 146 This added
capacity is more urgent at the present time because of the impact of a
changing climate on water availability and water demand. 147 If it seems
too radical for the decisional body to have the power to reorder priorities
subject to some form of ratification by the states, then the BWT/IJC
report and recommendation process would be a good method to initiate
changes in governing principles.

145. Id.
146. For example, the BWT was supplemented by the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement. See supra note 4.
147. See Hall, et al., supra note 98; see also Abrams & Hall, Framing,supra note 144.
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VI. CONCLUSION-PRESENT SUCCESSES AND PUTTING THEORY TO THE
TEST

It is fair to ask if there are any present models of interstate water
governance agreements that take a form suggested by extrapolation of
the workable aspects of the BWT/IJC model. There are two prominent
examples, one well established and the other freshly minted. The first is
the governance of the Delaware River water resource complex under the
Delaware River Basin Compact and, most importantly, the broad
resource management and decisional power vested in the Delaware River
Basin Commission. 148 The second, of course, is the recently enacted and
congressionally ratified Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water
Resources Compact. 149 This agreement very astutely reserves to each of
the basin states its historic police power regulatory role, but
accomplishes basin governance by adopting common standards for water
management, and an overarching composite control over out-of-basin
diversions. 150

It also is fair to ask whether systems of that nature could operate
successfully to resolve or avoid the interstate water allocation
controversies of the Catawba River, the ACF, or the Sparta Aquifer. On
the Catawba, having priorities that come into play under drought
conditions might eliminate or reduce upstream withdrawals for irrigation
to levels that are sufficiently protective of downstream South Carolina
interests for higher priority uses that no curtailment of the interbasin
municipal supply transfers would be necessary. Concurrently, there
ought to be a pre-established drought management plan that requires
increasingly stringent levels of water conservation for municipal useradically reducing landscape irrigation, limiting car washing and other
uses. The standards can increase or decrease in stringency as preestablished benchmark water availability levels are measured. In a case
like the Catawba, a transferee basin that is receiving the benefits of an
interbasin transfer for its municipal use should be required to make like
efforts at conservation as are being required in the basin of origin, and

148. See Delaware River Compact, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). Also similar in its
management aspects is the Susquehanna River Compact, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970). See also
Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of
PermanenceBecomes the Vice ofInflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 105 (2003).
149. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No.
110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008).
150. For the framework principles of that agreement and their federalism aspects, see
Hall, supra note 134.
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should reduce its diversion if doing so is feasible.15 ' The movement to a
proactive water management system in the Catawba seems possible for
other reasons as well. There is a degree of interstate consultation already
being practiced, even if it did not avert the lawsuit. Prior to approving the
latest application for a diversion out of the Catawba, North Carolina
water officials discussed the matter with South Carolina officials to
inquire about their views as an aid in assessing the potential benefits of
the diversion in the importing basin, which also flowed into South
Carolina.152 If master principles and priorities were in place, given the
relatively large amounts of water available in all but the driest years, an
agreement is feasible. It is worth noting that those same principles that
might benefit North Carolina in moving Catawba water to serve
municipal growth in a neighboring basin today, also would
53 benefit South
Carolina in the future if municipal growth occurs there. 1
The ACF situation is tractable under most flow conditions, thus the
real impact of an agreement comes into play only for droughts, and, even
then, only for severe droughts. If a priorities based management system
is put in place, it becomes fairly easy to predict the "hard cases" in which
very high priorities will suffer at the hands of higher priorities. As a
starting point, assume the priority list is human domestic use, ecosystem
protection, energy, and food/fiber production, in that order. As suggested
above in the Catawba example, as part of the planning, Atlanta and its
metropolitan region should be required to implement long term
conservation efforts, 154 knowing shortages are endemic, and more severe
restrictions on all non-essential use as short term conditions require.155
The plan also should include Flint River conservation, and the possibility
of reductions or curtailment of irrigation, even after planting. 15 6 What the
151. This sort of equalized conservation effort of all those benefiting from basin waters
is an element plainly missing in the ACF, where Georgia did not impose drought-linked
conservation measures in the Flint Basin during either the 2007 or 2008 drought, even
though Flint water could have helped provide ecological flows to the Apalachicola River
and estuary. See Abrams, ACF Controversy, supra note 68, n. 54-62 (current draft).
152. See North Carolina Brief, supra note 9, at 21 (reproducing Declaration of Thomas
Fransen 42).
153. If there is really not enough water for all municipalities, a drought plan might
have as a rule reductions to equal levels of per capita use, so that the burden of having to
do with less water would fall equally on citizens in both states.
154. Long term conservation measures include such things as low flow plumbing
fixtures as building code requirements, phase out of non-natural and non-drought
resistant landscaping, and possibly rainwater capture systems (at least in the Ocmulgee
basin).
155. See supra Part II.B.
156. The Georgia system now in place makes Flint River irrigation curtailment
decisions on a one time per season basis in March, based solely on conditions predicted
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recent history has already made clear is that the upstream power interests
will accept transfer payments rather than water without objection. The
municipal use, under the conservation conditions suggested here, is
almost entirely non-consumptive, so the real conflict is over maintaining
water in the reservoir as a hedge against continuing drought and
releasing that water to provide endangered species flows and flushing
flows to Apalachicola Bay, and possibly having sufficient water
available in the river's middle reaches for nuclear power plant cooling in
Alabama. If the drought is that bad, the priority system says other uses,
including irrigation in the Flint Basin, will already be curtailed and
recreation and navigation uses will just have to do the best they can with
the water that is present. If, at that point, providing water that supports
the millions of people in the metro Atlanta region is in issue, the priority
system would say the water stays in Lake Lanier to be used, as required,
for the most necessary of the basin's water needs. If the drought is that
long and that severe, the damage to the ecosystem may well occur even if
small additional releases are made. Those natural systems have endured
droughts across thousands of years and this one will be little different. If
global climate change is at work, and droughts are now more frequent
and severe, the ecosystem will have to adjust in any event.
Finally, there is the Sparta Aquifer problem. 157 From the Mississippi
complaint it is hard to tell whether there is a real water shortage issue or
merely a perceived invasion of Mississippi's claimed interest in the
groundwater being pumped. 5 8 What seems clear to a nafve outsider is
that the high quality Sparta Aquifer water ought to be used for municipal
supply because it is more valuable in that use than it is for any other. If
there is no harm being done to the aquifer's long term productive
capacity, there is no good reason to limit the use Memphis is making.
Assume instead, that there are Mississippi users whose wells have
failed in competition with the municipal wells of Memphis, but again
assume that there is no long term harm being done to the aquifer. That
would present a classic situation of what is called well interference and is
distinguishable from overdraft. 159 In a well interference setting, the
aquifer has enough water and recharge to serve all its users on a
sustainable basis. For that reason, the conflict is a local one that can be
adjusted in any of a number of ways so that both users can continue their
uses. The most common result in a setting like that is to impose the cost
for the Flint watershed rather than the entire ACF Basin. See GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-540
(2006). See also Abrams, ACF Controversy, supra note 68, n. 63-67 (current draft).
157. See supra Part II.C.
158. See Mississippi Amended Complaint, supra note 28.
159. SAX, ET AL., supra note 88, at 403-05.
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of accommodation on the high volume user, Memphis. 160 Memphis is in
a position to both spread and shift the cost to municipal users, who will
pay a great deal to have the tap water run and their toilets flush.
As a third hypothetical, assume that there is a resource competition
for Sparta Aquifer water that is resulting in unsustainable overdraft.
Considering the regional economy in that part of Mississippi, it seems
that the high volume water use competing with Memphis for the Sparta
Aquifer water would be irrigation, which can be done equally well with
lower quality water. 16' On the Mississippi side, in a region as humid and
as blessed with surface and aquifer resources, there is likely to be
sufficient water for irrigation from surface sources or from the highly
productive alluvial aquifer or the moderately productive Cockfield
Aquifer. 162 If that switch in sourcing failed to alleviate the conflict, and
conservation failed to alleviate the conflict, then a priority system would
give the disputed Sparta Aquiferwater to municipal use.
This completes an eclectic journey across a century of water
allocation disputes that stretch from the 5000 mile long United StatesCanadian border, to the Atlantic seaboard, to the plains of Georgia and
the Gulf Coast, and to the Mississippi River Valley. The tour has
demonstrated that water allocation disputes occur in places having very
ample water resources faced with occasional scarcity, as well as in
regions like the Milk and St. Mary Rivers, where the climate is
consistently arid and water makes the land productive and settlement
feasible. The tour has elements of a quest, seeking principles of intersovereign water dispute resolution and on-going water management that
are transferable from one time and place to another. The Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 has achieved considerable enduring success. In its
roots and institutions, in particular the International Joint Commission
and its objective approach to the resource and its preference-based
160. A particularly illuminating description of this facet of American water law is
found in Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900, 902 (Ala. 1980). The
court there explains that the previously dominant absolute ownership rule was replaced
by the American reasonable use rule in the context of cities pumping with high capacity
wells that "lowered the water table beyond the reach of the domestic wells of the
neighboring farmers. The rule forced the cities to pay damages to the farmers or provide
them with better wells and pumps and was an application of common tort policies of
distributing losses and of requiring those who receive the benefits from a harmful activity

to pay its costs." Id. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS,

§ 858 cmt. h, illus. 7 & 850A

cmt. 1 (1979) (suggesting the Restatement Second approach to groundwater well
interference caused by municipal pumping would result in municipal liability for
additional cost to replace supply of injured groundwater users).
161. The use of Sparta Aquifer water for irrigation is exactly what the neighboring
state of Arkansas is trying hard to prevent. See Sparta Fact Sheet, supra note 31.
162. See id. Fig. 1.
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decision making, the BWT contains elements that can be the basis for
other interjurisdictional water allocation and management agreements.
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APPENDIX A

2001 (Drought Year) Hydrograph at Gauge Station Five Miles Below
Lake Wylie.
Source: Reproduced from South Carolina Motion, supra note 9, at 20:
Figure 1. Measured average daily flow of the Catawba River in the year
2001, measured at USGS gage 02146000, located 3.5 miles below Lake
Wylie.
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